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Ethnic Fragmentation, Conflict, Displaced Persons and 
Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis
* 
 
Ethnic conflicts and their links to international human trafficking have recently received a 
surge in international attention. It appears that ethnic conflicts exacerbate the internal 
displacement of individuals from networks of family and community, and their access to 
economic and social safety nets. These same individuals are then vulnerable to being 
trafficked by the hopes of better economic prospects elsewhere. In this paper, we empirically 
examine this link between ethnic fragmentation, conflicts, internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
refugees and international trafficking, making use of a novel dataset of international 
trafficking. We conduct a direct estimation, which highlights the ultimate impact of ethnic 
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The  link  between  ethnic  conflicts  and  international  trafficking  is  an  issue  that  has  recently 
received a surge in international attention. The main argument is that internal conflicts encourage 
the  internal  displacement  of  individuals  from  networks  of  family  and  community,  and  their 
access to economic and social safety nets. These same individuals are particularly vulnerable to 
being trafficked, by the hopes of better economic prospects elsewhere.  In this paper, we take this 
link  between  ethnic  fragmentation,  conflicts,  internal  and  internally  displaced  people  from  a 
country and international trafficking to the data for the first time, making use of a novel dataset 
of international trafficking.  
 
While there is an extensive empirical literature linking ethnic fragmentation to conflict, and an 
equally  extensive  literature  linking    conflict  to  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  and 
international refugees, scant empirical attention has been accorded either to the link between 
IDPs / refugees and international human trafficking or to the link between ethnic fragmentation, 
conflict, IDPs/refugees and trafficking. Given that the factors that force migration within and 
across international borders are similar to the ones that are at play in the trafficking context, it 
would seem natural explore the link. However, before we look into the existing literature in this 
area, it is necessary to unravel the causal link from ethnic fragmentation to conflict since the 
issue of IDPs and refugees is crucially linked to the incidence and intensity of conflict.  
 
Is ethnic fragmentation a cause for conflict within nations?  The answer is not clear. Prior to 
1980, only fifteen countries could be identified as homogenous with the two Koreas, Portugal 
and Japan leading this select group (Connor, 1983; Lee et.al, 2002). Correspondingly over the 
1950-1989  period,  Gurr  (1993)  finds  that  non-violent  protests  by  ethnic  minority  groups 
increased by 230%, violent protests rose by 430% and rebellions increased by 360%. Since the 
end  of  the  Cold  War  the  fraction  of  countries  that  could  be  characterized  as  ethnically 
homogenous has fallen further with the break-up of the ex-Soviet Union, and as Reilly (2000) 
reports, of the 110 major conflicts globally over this time period, 103 were intra-state in nature. 
A primary cause of ethnic conflict across nations arises out of interactions between ethnic groups 
and government, through either (i) government coercion in response to the threat of dissent and 
rebellion  from  ethnic  groups;  (ii)  ethnic  groups  having  a  mobilization  advantage  and  are 
therefore more likely to engage in protest or (iii) democratization, which ties a government’s 
hands with respect to coercion thereby allowing ethnic groups the leeway to mobilize and protest  
(Lee  st.al,  2002).  Lindstrom  (1996)  in  fact  finds  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  ethnic 
fragmentation is positively correlated with conflict, in consonance with the theory that ethnic 
fragmentation is closely related with mobilization for dissent.  
 
The literature on the link between ethnic fragmentation and conflict can be further classified into 
two branches – democratic and non-democratic societies. In democratic societies, the main cause 
of conflict is increasing inter ethnic-group economic inequality caused by (i) economic policies 
instituted by the government, (ii) the classic tragedy of the commons case wherein one ethnic 
group  fails  to  internalize  the  costs  that  their  choices  impart  on  other  ethnic  groups,  (iii) 
bureaucratic corruption, (iv) the ‘resource curse’ where the rents from natural resource extraction 
accrue only to a minority group within a country and finally (v) political transitions. In so far as 
issues (i), (ii) and (iii) above are concerned, Horowitz (1985) notes that individuals often derive 3 
 
enjoyment from seeing benefits accrue to members of their group (be it class- or ethnic-based) 
even when they themselves do not directly share in those benefits. Empirically, Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly (1999) find that U.S. cities characterized by higher levels of ethnic fragmentation 
and economic inequality exhibit  higher overall levels of both government spending and debt 
while at the same time devote lower shares of total spending towards investment in public goods. 
This  suggests  that  cities  with  higher  ethnic  fragmentation  and  inequality  spend  more  on 
patronage for conflicting special interest groups. Thus, any economic or social policy that is 
deemed to confer additional benefits purely to a particular ethnic group can be a cause for dissent 
and conflict. An additional cause of ethnic conflict stems from the inability of international, 
national and regional powers to adequately provide security for minority groups. Finally for non-
democratic countries, ethnic conflict is more often than not linked to repression of ethnic groups 
by military dictatorships, and frequent struggles for power through coups and rebellions. 
 
However, it can be argued that that ethnic fragmentation (or the share of an ethnic group in the 
total  population)  within  a  country  does  not  necessarily  imply  dissent  even  in  the  face  of 
perceived unjust economic and social policies --- what matters probably more is the relative 
strength of an ethnic group vis-à-vis others within a country. While the theories linking ethnic 
fragmentation and conflict are wide-ranging and still debated, the link between conflict (ethnic, 
religious, ideological, or otherwise) and the problem of IDPs and refugees is far more clear-cut. 
IDPs and international refugees constitute the spectrum of people fleeing conflict, post-conflict 
returnees,  people  displaced  by  environmental  and  natural  disasters,  people  displaced  by 
development projects like large dams. Spiegel (2004) notes that by the end of 2002, there were 
approximately 40 million displaced people globally with 15 million refugees (UNHCR, 2003), 
and 25 million IDPs (Global IDP Project, 2003). Moreover, IDPs and refugees are either the 
poorest or those stripped of resources by stronger groups (Mani, 2005).  Displacement leads to 
the breakdown of social structures and informal and formal insurance mechanisms along with a 
disruption  of  employment,  healthcare,  education  and  financial  services  making  IDPs  and 
refugees a vulnerable group. Specially affected amongst the IDPs and refugees are women and 
children who suffer the most in terms of food insecurity, hunger and unequal distribution of 
material goods. As a result, women and children are the most at risk of exploitation and abuse, 
including coercion into transactional sex for survival. Indeed, Mani (2005) points to the case of 
Sierra Leone where provisions were allocated to women refugees in exchange of sexual favors 
with the threat of violence.   
 
While studies do document that women and children are the most vulnerable amongst IDPs and 
refugees  it  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  this  group  are  also  victims  of  trafficking  across 
international borders. Our hypothesis that conflict-prone countries with a high number of IDPs 
and  source  countries  for  refugees  may  also  turn  out to  be  the  source  country  for  trafficked 
victims is based on two sets of information delineated below. First, data on the countries of 
origin for asylum seekers into North America, Western Europe and Australia closely mirror the 
country of origin of trafficked victims into these regions. Second, case studies based on two 
ethnically fragmented and conflict prone countries --- Nigeria and Nepal --- show that the IDPs 
and refugees, specially, women and children, are indeed victims of trafficking. 
 
Data on international refugees and asylum seekers from the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) show that the global refugee population grew from 2.4 million in 1975 4 
 
14.9  million  in 1990.  After reaching  a peak at the end of the Cold  War the global refugee 
population had declined to 12.1 million  in 2000 (UNHCR 1995; UNHCR 2000, Castles and 
Loughna, 2003). Refugees came mainly from countries affected by civil conflict with the top ten 
countries of origin in 1999 being Afghanistan (2.6 million), Iraq (572,000), Burundi (524,000), 
Sierra  Leone  (487,000),  Sudan  (468,000),  Somalia  (452,000),  Bosnia  (383,000),  Angola 
(351,000), Eritrea (346,000) and Croatia (340,000).  
 
Next  we  look  at  the  top  ten  countries  of  origin  for  asylum-seekers  entering  USA,  Canada, 
Western Europe and Australia from 1990 to 2001 According to Castles and Loughna (2003), the 
countries of origin of the top ten asylum seekers into the USA over the 1990-2001 period were 
El Salvador (223,887), Guatemala (178,047), Mexico (66,338), China (60,926), Haiti (51,308), 
Nicaragua (34,411), India (30,985), Russia (20,913), Pakistan (16,700) and Cuba (16,600) with 
the share of the top ten being 70% of the total number of asylum seekers over this time period. 
Notable here is the fact that the top three countries in question (El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Mexico) are also ethnically fragmented and conflict ridden countries with a significant number 
of IDPs and refugees from neighboring conflict prone countries like Nicaragua and Honduras. A 
similar pattern for asylum seekers can be also observed for Canada with the top ten countries of 
origin for asylum seekers being Sri Lanka (40,009), Somalia (21,120), Pakistan (18,680), China 
(17,651), Iran (15,590), India (14,106), Mexico (8,940), Hungary (8,915), Israel (8,527), DR 
Congo (8,229) with the share of the top ten being 46% of the total number of asylum seekers 
over the 1990-2001 time period. Once again, the top three countries of origin of asylum seekers 
into Canada (Sri Lanka, Somalia and Pakistan) are ethnically fragmented and conflict ridden 
countries. Moreover, Somalia is also host to refugees fleeing conflict and food insecurity from 
Ethiopia and Sudan, Pakistan being host to Afghan refugees while DR Congo hosts refugees 
from Rwanda. Coincidentally, data from 2002 also show that the USA and Canada are also host 
countries of trafficked victims from Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador (Akee et.al, 2009).  
 
For Western Europe the top ten countries of origin of asylum-seekers over the 1990-2001 time 
period were FR Yugoslavia (935,973), Romania (412,326), Turkey (392,867), Iraq (272,918), 
Afghanistan (192,581), Bosnia & Herzegovina (184,005), Sri Lanka (169,666), Iran (143,651), 
Somalia (142,148), DR Congo (123,441) with the top ten share of the total number of asylum 
seekers over the 1990-2001 time period being 59%. All countries in the top ten list are ethnically 
fragmented with either prolonged periods of civil conflict or in political transition. Similar to the 
USA  and  Canada,  Western  European  countries  are  also  host  to  trafficked  victims  from  the 
conflict prone countries of Eastern Europe (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, 
amongst others) and Africa (Somalia, Nigeria Sierra Leone and Mozambique, amongst others).  
Finally, for Australia the top ten countries of origin of asylum-seekers between 1996-2001 were 
Indonesia  (7,529),  China  (6,649),  Iraq  (5,378),  Philippines  (4,665),  Afghanistan  (4,241),  Sri 
Lanka (4,025), India (2,873), Fiji (2,134), Iran (1,910), Thailand (1,263) with the top ten share of 
the total number of asylum seekers over this time period being 65%. Needless to say, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka have been plagued by prolonged ethnic conflicts, and Australia is also a host 
country of trafficked victims from Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia, amongst others. 
 
However, one cannot draw a definite conclusion that the pattern of asylum seekers and trafficked 
victims  are positively correlated  from a casual  look at the data. After all,  asylum  migration 
(which is legal) and trafficking (illegal) are distinctly different channels through which people 5 
 
move or are moved across borders. While it might well be that trafficked victims could be either 
be misled with the hope of gaining asylum in host countries by middlemen or that trafficking 
becomes the next best alternative in response to stringent immigration laws in host countries, the 
dynamics  of  legal  migration  is  distinct  from  that  of  illicit  migration  like  trafficking  where 
migrants  face  different  levels  of  risk,  vulnerability  and  employment  outcomes  in  the  host 
countries. Suffice to say, that some of the push factors behind asylum migration, namely (i) 
repression of minorities or ethnic conflict, (ii) civil war, (iii) high numbers of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) relative to total population, (iv) poverty as reflected in low per capita income, (v) 
low  position  on  the  Human  Development  Index  (HDI),  (vi)  low  life  expectancy,  (vii)  high 
population density and (viii) high adult literacy rate; mirror closely the push factors that induce 
trafficking, namely (i) poverty, (ii)  lack of educational opportunities and (iii) armed conflict 
(Castles and Loughna, 2003; Akee et.al, 2009). To get a better sense of what drives the positive 
correlation between conflict, IDPs/refugees and trafficked victims we look at two case studies, 
from Nigeria (ethnic, religious and resource conflict) and Nepal (ideological conflict). 
 
Our data on trafficking suggests that Nigeria is hub country of trafficked victims (women and 
children). In other words, it is both a source as well as a host country for trafficking. Victims are 
trafficked out of Nigeria to Western Europe, South Africa and Gulf countries while trafficked 
victims enter Nigeria from West African countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Cameroon 
and Côte d’Ivoire (Akee et.al. 2009). Recent evidence suggests that traffickers in Kano state 
exploited  the  annual  pilgrimage  to  Mecca  to  traffic  children,  men  and  women  for  different 
exploitative purposes like prostitution, begging and domestic work. Moreover, and historically, 
women are recruited in the Edo state and are trafficked into Italy, Netherlands, Spain and other 
countries  to  work  as  prostitutes  (de  Haas,  2006;  Ehindero  et  al.  2006;  and  Carling,  2005). 
Concurrently,  Nigerians  are  the  fifth  largest  group  of  asylum  seekers  in  Western  European 
countries while at the same time host a large number of refugees and asylum seekers – majority 
of  whom  are  from  Sierra  Leone,  Chad,  Liberia,  DR  Congo,  Sudan  (Darfur),  Somalia,  Côte 
d’Ivoire, Niger and Cameroon (de Haas, 2006). There are also two major issues that lead to a 
high degree of  labor mobility within Nigeria: conflict and the institution of ‘foster’ children. 
Religious and ethnic conflicts (in Plateau and Kano states in 2004 and in Benue state in 2001 
respectively) as well as conflicts over crude oil mining and refining in the Delta area has led to 
Nigeria having the highest number of IDPs in West Africa --- estimated to be as high as 1.2 
million at the end of the 1990s (de Haas, 2006). Further, child fostering is a well-established 
practice in Nigeria in which poor rural families send their children to family members in urban 
areas so that they can get better education and employment opportunities. However, several of 
these children end up working as child laborers. Thus, IDPs, refugees into Nigeria, and foster 
children combine to constitute a vulnerable group susceptible to traffickers (de Haas, 2006).  
 
Nepal, unlike Nigeria which is a hub country of trafficking, is a source country for trafficked 
victims primarily into India. Further, armed conflict between Maoist guerillas and the ex-Royal 
Nepalese  Army  has  led to an  estimated displacement of 200,000 people  both  internally and 
across  the  border  (Internal  Displacement  Monitoring  Centre,  2006;  Bharadwaj  et.  al  2007). 
However, a high percentage of the displaced population in Nepal constitute women and young 




With the above background in place, we empirically test whether there is indeed a correlation 
between ethnic fragmentation, conflict, IDPs/refugees and trafficking. In what follows, we use 
religious and linguistic fragmentation, in addition to ethnic fragmentation and different measures 
of conflict to understand which type(s) of fragmentation and conflict(s) are most significant in 
explaining the presence of IDPs within and refugees from a country, as well as the factors that 




For this research on human trafficking and the relationship between internally displaced persons 
and  refugees,  ethnic  fragmentation  and  conflict,  data  were  collected  from  various  sources 
described  below.  A  description  of  these  specific  variables  can  be  found  in  Table  1,  which 
contains  all  the  variables  employed  in  our  estimations.  Table  2  shows  the  basic  descriptive 
statistics  of  the  dataset  at  the  country  level  for  the  main  explanatory  variables  of  interest: 
fragmentation, IDPs/refugees and conflict measures. Finally, Table 3 provides the descriptive 
statistics of the estimation sample. 
 
Data  on  the  reported  incidence  of  trafficking  was  compiled  from  the  country-by-country 
descriptive accounts of the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report (US Department of State 2003). A 
country is designated as a “Host” country for trafficked victims only if 100 cases were reported 
in the past year. Country host-source pairs of trafficking are coded from these reports for the year 
2002.  The  number  of  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  and  IDP-like  situations  are  data 
collected by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations 
Refugee agency and we use their data for the period 1993-2001. We use data on the number of 
refugees  from origin  from UNHCR to generate an average  for the  years 1993 to 2001. The 
incidence of refugees from a source country along with IDPs within a source country is then 
combined  in  a  single  IDPs/refugees  dummy  variable  for  a  source  country.  Fragmentation 
measures  were  taken  from  Alesina  et  al.  (2003),  where  fragmentation  (ethnic,  religious  or 
linguistic) is defined as   where  is the share of group i, (i = 1….N) in 
country j. Ethnic, religious and language fractionalization cover a larger range of countries and 
various  aspects  of  fragmentation,  which  we  employ  here  to  understand  the  impact  on 
international trafficking. As Alesina et al. (2003) discuss, these three indices are correlated and 
we will employ them separately in our estimations. The ethnic fragmentation measures were 
available  for  various  years  until  2001,  while  language  and  religious  fragmentation  were 
measured for the year 2001.    
 
Conflict  measures  were  collected  from  the  Uppsala  Conflict  Data  Program  (UCDP)/ 
International  Peace  Research  Institute,  Oslo  (PRIO)  Armed  Conflict  Dataset  (2009)  and 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) for the period 1946 to 2001. We employ an average of these measures 
over this time period in our estimations. We account for various measures of conflict in our 
estimations. First, we use two measures that capture the intensity of conflict: (i) the cumulative 
intensity dummy takes into account the history of the conflict. It takes the value 0 if the conflict 
has resulted in less than 1,000 battle-related deaths and 1 otherwise and (ii) the level intensity of 
conflict is measured by distinguishing between either a minor conflict or a war (where a minor 
conflict has more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period while a war is 
defined as one where are more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the 7 
 
period). Second, we use a count measure of the number of conflicts within a country. Third and 
finally, we use a more complex measure that differentiates between the types of conflict into four 
categories.  
 
�  The type 1 variable takes the value 0. 1, 2, 3 respectively and distinguishes between no 
conflict, minor armed conflict,  intermediate armed conflict and war at the  extra-state 
level (extra-state conflict is a conflict over a territory between a government and one or 
more opposition groups, where the territory is a colony of the government. Also, a minor 
conflict is one where more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the 
period has  been reported, an  intermediate conflict is one where  more than 25  battle-
related deaths per year (but less than 1000) with a total conflict history of more than 1000 
battle-related reported deaths while a war is where more than 1000 battle-related deaths 
has been reported per year for every year in the period).  
 
�  The type 2 variable takes the value 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively for no conflict, minor armed 
conflict, intermediate armed conflict and war at the interstate level (interstate conflict is a 
conflict between two or more countries and governments ).  
 
�  The type 3 variable takes the value 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively and separates the conflict 
levels  at  the  internal  level  (internal  conflict  is  conflict  within  a  country  between  a 
government  and  one  or  more  opposition  groups,  with  no  interference  from  other 
countries).  
 
�  The  type  4  variable  distinguishes  whether  the  conflict/war  was  an  internationalized 
internal one or not, and then at what level (minor armed conflict, intermediate armed 
conflict or war. An Internationalized internal conflict is similar to internal conflict, but 
where  the  government,  the  opposition  or  both  sides  receive  support  from  other 
governments).  
 
In addition to the data on trafficking, ethnic/religious/linguistic fragmentation, IDPs/refugees, 
and conflict we use the following as control variables. First, we use Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)  for the  host  and  source  countries  as  the  refugees  and  trafficking  literature  finds  that 
relatively  poorer  countries  are  source  countries  while  richer  countries  are  the  host  for 
international refugees and trafficked victims. Second, we use an indicator variable – landlocked -
--  that  takes  on  a  value  of  1  if  a  country  (trafficking  host  or  source)  is  landlocked  and  0 
otherwise. Third, we use a common border and common region dummies for host and source 
countries of trafficking. These last three variables (landlocked, common border and common 
region) are meant to account for the ease with which both refugees and trafficked victims can 
move between source and host countries, and whether the incidence of refugee migration and 
trafficking are more likely to be observed within a common region and between neighboring 
countries.  The  GDP  and  the  landlocked  indicator  were  obtained  from  the  World  Bank 
Development Indicators for the year 2000. The common border and common region measures 
were self collected and coded from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2001). 
 
Frequently  cited  in  the  trafficking  literature  is  the  role  of  (or  the  lack  thereof)  legislation 
surrounding  prostitution  activities  and  the  enforcement  of  these  laws  since  most  trafficked 8 
 
victims are women and children who are forced into exploitative sexual activities. We use data 
on  legislation  surrounding  prostitution  activities  (pimping,  pandering,  brothels)  from  the 
Protection Project Country Report (2002) for the year 2001 and the ‘rule of law’ index from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999 a & b) to proxy for corruption and governance for 
all countries in our dataset. The “rule of law” indicator is a composite index of (i) voice (e.g., 
freedom of press and the freedom to associate) and accountability; (ii) political stability/lack of 
violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv)  regulatory  framework; (v) rule of  law; and (vi) 
control of corruption. The index ranges from -3 (worst) to +3 (best). 
 
The reason for using legislation surrounding prostitution as a variable across host and source 
countries  of  trafficking  stems  from  the  following  argument.  First,  stricter  laws  surrounding 
prostitution in source countries makes it an illegal activity in these countries and one would 
expect that prostitution commands a higher return in an illegal market rather than a legal one to 
compensate for the risk of getting caught and punished. However, a higher return from illegal 
prostitution in the source country allows traffickers and middlemen to extract a higher price from 
buyers of trafficked victims in the host countries if these earnings from illegal prostitution in the 
source country constitute the ‘reservation’ price at which traffickers sell their victims in the host 
country. Similarly, a ban on prostitution in the host countries of trafficking would imply that 
prostitutes in this illegal activity would earn a higher return than otherwise. Again, this allows 
for a higher price to be extracted for trafficked victims by the middlemen who sell these victims 
to the host country buyer. As we show in Akee et. al (2010), a ban on prostitution in either a 
source or a host country can tilt the incentive in favor of traffickers to move victims across 
borders for the purpose of prostitution.    
 
Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
To determine the  link  between ethnic conflicts  and  international  trafficking, we estimate the 
direct effect of ethnic fragmentation, various types of external and internal conflicts, presence of 
IDPs/refugees in a source country on the incidence of trafficking between countries. This model 
is presented below:  
 
 
    
                 
 
where trafficking is the binary dependent variable for the incidence of trafficking from country i 
to country j (source i to host j). This variable takes the value 1 if an incidence of trafficking from 
country i to country j is reported and 0 otherwise.  
 
The variable frag measures fragmentation in the source country of trafficking. It is measured 
continuously from 0 to 1 while  is the squared value of the fragmentation variable. Three 
measures, ethnic, religious and language fractionalization, are included in turn in the different 
regression specifications. The dummy variable refidp indicates the presence of refugees as well 
as internally displaced persons in the source country. The variable conflict captures the various 
measures of conflict in a source country that we have discussed earlier, and we include these 9 
 
various measures in separate regression specifications for each fragmentation measure (ethnic, 
religious and linguistic). The control variables for the host and source countries include GDP, 
prohibition  of  prostitution,  rule  of  law  index,  common  border,  common  region  and  the 
landlocked dummy. 
 
We report the results related to the direct impact of ethnic/religious/linguistic  fragmentation, 
conflict and IDPs/refugees on the dummy variable capturing the incidence of trafficking between 
two countries – host and source. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 reports the results, with Table 4.1 being 
specific to the ethnic fragmentation variable while Tables 4.2 and 4.3 specific to the religious 
and linguistic fragmentation variables respectively.  
 
From Table 4.1, we start with those results that are robust to all the conflict measures used in our 
regression (cumulative intensity, level intensity, count, Types 1-4 and location). We find that a 
lower GDP for source countries and a higher GDP for host countries increases the likelihood of a 
source-host match for trafficking. This is in consonance with both earlier empirical studies (Akee 
et.al. 2010) and the literature based on government reports and victim surveys that the countries 
of origin for trafficked victims are relatively poorer as compared to the destination countries. The 
coefficient on common border and common region are positive and significant for both the host 
and  source  countries  of  trafficking  implying  that  the  likelihood  of  a  host-source  match  for 
trafficking increases for countries that share a common border or are in a common geographical 
region.  This  underscores  the  fact  that  lower  transportation  costs  play  a  significant  role  in 
explaining the incidence of trafficking between countries. The likelihood to a host-source match 
for trafficking also increases if a host country is not landlocked --- possibly since countries with 
sea ports allows traffickers to import victims from a wider spectrum of countries.  
 
As expected, the presence of IDPs/refugees in the source countries increases the likelihood of 
trafficking in support of the literature that IDPs and refugees are particularly vulnerable to being 
lured into relocating for employment opportunities, and can subsequently be coerced into illicit 
activities abroad. Table 4.1 also shows the impact of ethnic fragmentation on the incidence of 
trafficking  under  the  various  conflict  measures.  Higher  ethnic  fragmentation  increases  the 
likelihood of trafficking  from a country while the coefficient on the squared term on ethnic 
fragmentation is negative and significant under all the conflict measures. This implies that ethnic 
fragmentation  increases  the  likelihood  of  trafficking  but  at  a  decreasing  rate.  A  possible 
explanation  of  this  result  might  be  that  higher  ethnic  fragmentation  allows  middlemen  or 
traffickers to easily target members of different ethnic groups and take advantage of the limited 
information that potential job seekers have of their credibility. However, as the number of ethnic 
groups becomes too large, or crosses a critical threshold, middlemen and traffickers may find 
difficult to operate across different groups if the level of mistrust between members of different 
ethnic groups rises correspondingly. 
 
As far as our legislative variable is concerned, a ban on prostitution in the source countries of 
trafficking is associated with a higher likelihood of trafficking. However, it is weakly significant 
and only for the cumulative intensity, level intensity and count measures of conflict. A possible 
explanation (and as we discussed earlier) might have to do with a higher reservation price that an 
illegal market for prostitution bestows on a middleman in the source country in bargaining with a 
potential buyer in the host country of a trafficked victim. A higher likelihood of trafficking is 10 
 
also associated with a source country not being landlocked under our cumulative intensity, level 
intensity and count measures of conflict. Again existence of sea ports facilitates easier export of 
trafficked victims from a source country. The rule of law index is negative and significant for 
source countries but again only for the regression specifications associated with the count and 
types  1-4  measures  of  conflict.  As  one  might  expect,  higher  corruption  levels  and  weaker 
governance structures in poorer countries are likely to lead to these countries becoming origins 
for trafficked victims.  
 
Turning to the various conflict measures we find that the cumulative intensity, level intensity and 
count measure of conflict are insignificant predictors of trafficking incidence. However, types 1-
4 measures of conflict are significant, with types 1, 3, 4 reducing while type 2 increasing the 
incidence of trafficking. Recall that type 1 is extra-state conflict (conflict within a territory with a 
colonial power and opposition within the colony as adversaries), type 3 is intra-state (between a 
government  and  opposition  forces  with  no  help  from  outside  governments),  type  4  is 
internationalized intra-state conflict (between a government and opposition forces with help from 
outside governments for either parties) and type 2 inter-state conflict (between two countries). 
Thus, types 1, 3 and 4 can be categorized as internal conflicts while type 2 is an external conflict. 
Our results therefore indicate that internal conflicts reduce the likelihood of trafficking while 
external conflicts exacerbate the problem. This result, while paradoxical, may be due to the fact 
that internal conflicts are more likely to disrupt internal transportation networks in a country 
which impedes the movement of traffickers and potential victims alike.  
 
Table  4.2  reports  the  results  when  we  use  religious  fragmentation  along  with  the  different 
measures  of  conflict  to  predict  the  incidence  of  trafficking.  Once  again,  irrespective  of  the 
measure of conflict used, a lower GDP for a source and a higher GDP for the host country leads 
to higher likelihood of a host-source trafficking match.  The presence of IDPs/refugees in the 
source country, common border, common region, and the host country not being landlocked all 
positively affect the likelihood of trafficking. Akin to the case of ethnic fragmentation, religious 
fragmentation in the source country has a positive but decreasing impact on the likelihood of 
trafficking under all measures of conflict. The rule of law index for source countries is negative 
and significant for source countries but only for the count and types 1-4 measures of conflict 
while a ban on prostitution in the source country is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood  of  trafficking  for  the  cumulative  intensity,  level  intensity  and  count  measures  of 
conflict. Finally, internal conflicts (types 1, 3 and 4) decreases, while external conflict (type 2) in 
a source country increases the likelihood of trafficking. In this respect, the direct impacts of 
religious fragmentation are very similar to those for ethnic fragmentation.  
 
Lastly, we use the linguistic fragmentation along with the various measures of conflict to see if 
linguistic  fragmentation  plays  any  role  in  predicting  the  likelihood  of  trafficking  between 
countries. As Table 4.3 reports, similar to the case for ethnic and religious fragmentation (and 
irrespective of the measure of conflict used), a lower GDP for a source and a higher GDP for the 
host country, presence of IDPs/refugees in the source country, common border, common region 
and a non-landlocked host all increase the likelihood of a source-host trafficking match. A lower 
rule of law in the source country has a positive and significant effect on trafficking but only 
under the count and types 1-4 measure of conflict while a ban on prostitution in the source 
country increases the likelihood of trafficking under the cumulative intensity, level intensity and 11 
 
count measures of conflict. However, the case of ethnic and religious fragmentation, linguistic 
fragmentation has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of trafficking only under 
the count and types 1-4 measures of conflict. Nevertheless, once again internal conflicts (types 1, 
3 and 4) decreases, while external conflict (type 2) in a source country increases the likelihood of 
trafficking. 
  
To summarize, the direct impacts on the incidence of trafficking are (i) lower GDP in source 
countries, (ii) higher GDP in host countries, (iii) presence of IDPs/refugees in the source country, 
(iv) common border, (v) common region, (vi) a non-landlocked host country, (vii) a lower rule of 
law  for source countries and (viii) external  conflicts  in source countries are all positive and 
significant predictors of a source-host trafficking match irrespective of whether we use ethnic, 
religious or linguistic measures of fragmentation. Meanwhile, internal conflicts are negative but 
significant predictors of trafficking under for all three fragmentation indices (ethnic, religious 
and linguistic). While linguistic fragmentation is positive and significant predictor of trafficking 
likelihood  only  under  the  count  and  types  1-4  measures  of  conflict,  ethnic  and  religious 




This paper is a first to explore the nexus between ethnic/religious/fragmentation, different types 
of conflict, the presence of IDPs and refugees and the incidence of trafficking. Specifically, we 
relate  international  trafficking  with  two  separate  literatures  that  studies  the  link  between 
ethnic/religious  fragmentation  and  conflict  on  one  hand,  and  the  link  between  conflict  and 
IDPs/refugee other to show that ethnic and religious fragmentation, along with various measures 
of conflict and the presence of IDPs and refugees in a country are significant predictors of the 
likelihood of trafficking amongst countries. However, our results in the paper, specially, those 
that relate to the various measures of conflict are sometimes paradoxical and require further 
analysis by either regrouping or recoding the various types of conflict that might be overlap with 
each  other,  or  employing  a  different  estimation  strategy  to  eliminate  possible  collinearity 
between the fragmentation, conflict and the IDPs/refugees variables. To partially account for this 
latter problem we run probit regressions with the IDPs/refugees as a dependant variable and 
fragmentation, conflict measures and controls for the source countries. The results are reported in 
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The results related to the measures of conflict (specially, internal ones) are paradoxical at first 
glance.  More  often  than  not,  ethnic  fragmentation,  conflict  and  IDPs/refugees  are  highly 
correlated and while estimating the direct effects, multicollinearity amongst these three variables 
might well be at play. To partially, account for the collinearity problem we turn to the results 
from a probit regression below.  
 
                                                         
      
 
In the above equation, the dependent binary dummy variable is now the incidence of refugees 
and internally displaced at source country level while the explanatory variables are the measures 
of fragmentation, conflict and controls at the source country level.   
 
We report the regression results  for the ethnic, religious and  linguistic  fragmentation  below. 
Overall  our  results  suggest  that  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  different  fragmentation 
variables and the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons in our data. We also find 
evidence that there is some relationship between the presence of refugees or internally displaced 
persons and other variables of interest. This high level of correlation may explain the relatively 
large standard errors for certain coefficients in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
Table 5.1 reports the results for ethnic fragmentation. A lower GDP and a lower rule of law 
index is associated with the presence of IDPs and refugees under all the conflict measures. A ban 
on  prostitution  has  a  positive  impact  on  IDPs  and  refugees  under  the  count  and  types  1-4 15 
 
measures of conflict while a non-landlocked country has an increased likelihood of the presence 
of IDPs and refugees under the cumulative intensity and level intensity measures of conflict. 
Ethnic  fragmentation  plays  a  positive  but  decreasing  role  under  the  cumulative  and  level 
intensity of conflict but a negative and increasing role under the count and types 1-4 measures of 
conflict in explaining the presence of IDPs and refugees. Cumulative intensity, level intensity, 
count and types 3 and 4 (internal conflicts) are positive and significant while types 1 (internal 
conflict within a colony) and 2 (inter-state conflicts) are negative and significant predictors of the 
presence of IDPs and refugees in a country. 
 
Next we use religious fragmentation as a predictor of IDPs/refugees along with the different 
conflict  measures  and  controls  for  the  source  countries  of  trafficking.    As  Table  5.2  shows 
religious fragmentation is a positive and significant predictor of the presence of IDPs/refugees in 
a source country of trafficking for all measures of conflict. A lower GDP, a lower rule of law 
index  as  well  as  legislations  banning  prostitution  positively  increase  the  likelihood  of  the 
presence of IDPs and refugees in source countries of trafficking. A non-landlocked country has 
an increased likelihood of the presence of IDPs and refugees under the cumulative intensity and 
level  intensity  measures  of  conflict  but  a  decreased  likelihood  under  the  count  measure  of 
conflict. Similar to the case of ethnic fragmentation, cumulative intensity, level intensity, count 
and types 3 and 4 (internal conflicts) are positive and significant while types 1 (internal conflict 
within  a  colony)  and  2  (inter-state  conflicts)  are  negative  and  significant  predictors  of  the 
presence of IDPs and refugees in a country. 
 
Finally, we find that the results for linguistic fragmentation (Table 5.3) are very similar to those 
for religious fragmentation above. Linguistic fragmentation is a positive and significant predictor 
of the presence of IDPs/refugees in a source country of trafficking for all measures of conflict. 
Similar to the case of ethnic and religious fragmentation, cumulative intensity, level intensity, 
count and types 3 and 4 (internal conflicts) are positive and significant while types 1 (internal 
conflict within a colony) and 2 (inter-state conflicts) are negative and significant predictors of the 
presence  of  IDPs  and  refugees  in  a  country.  A  lower  GDP  and  a  lower  rule  of  law  index 
positively increase the likelihood of the presence of IDPs and refugees in source countries of 
trafficking. A non-landlocked country has an increased likelihood of the presence of IDPs and 
refugees under the cumulative intensity and level intensity measures of conflict but a decreased 
likelihood under the count and types 1-4 measures of conflict. Finally a ban on prostitution has a 
positive influence on the presence of IDPs and refugees only under the count and types 1-4 
measures of conflict.  
 
In effect, our results show that ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation, along with our 
various measures of internal conflicts turn out to be strong predictors of the presence of IDPs and 
refugees.  We  acknowledge  that  this  may  have  increased  the  standard  errors  in  our  main 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Fragmentation, IDPs/Refugees and Armed Conflict, 
country level  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fragmentation data
ethnic fractionalization 180 0.440 0.255 0 0.930
religious fractionalization 177 0.391 0.277 0.002 0.923
language fractionalization 184 0.437 0.235 0.002 0.860
IDPs and Refugees data
IDPs and IDP-like situations (1993-2001 average) 187 25676.09 101896.5 0 875402.9
refugee population by origin (1992-2001 average) 187 63.490 259.093 0 3134.588
IDPs/IDP-like situation and refugees 187 87613.63 312417.1 0 3378246
IDPs/IDP-like situation and refugees dummy 187 0.390 0.489 0 1
Armed Conflict
Conflict 1
Intensity level of conflict  108 1.272 0.296 1 2
Cumulative intensity level of conflict 108 0.452 0.375 0 1
Conflict 2 (1946-2001 average)
Number of conflicts within a country 187 0.257 0.471 0 4.148
Type 1 (extra-state) 187 0.025 0.119 0 0.893
Type 2 (interstate) 187 0.093 0.217 0 1.104
Type 3 (internal) 187 0.206 0.415 0 2.463
Type 4 (internalized internal) 187 0.144 0.353 0 2.259
Source: Authors' calcuations based on Alesina et al. (2003); UNHCR; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset; Gleditsch et al. (2002). 
Descriptive Statistics: Fragmentation, IDPs/Refugees and Armed Conflict, country level
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the estimation sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trafficking 34969 0.017 0.130 0.000 1.000
ethnic 33660 0.440 0.254 0.000 0.930
religion 34408 0.437 0.234 0.002 0.860
language 33099 0.391 0.276 0.002 0.923
refugees/idps  34969 0.390 0.488 0.000 1.000
cumulative intensity 20196 0.452 0.373 0.000 1.000
intensity 20196 1.272 0.294 1.000 2.000
count 34969 0.257 0.470 0.000 4.148
type1 34969 0.025 0.119 0.000 0.893
type2 34969 0.093 0.216 0.000 1.104
type3 34969 0.206 0.413 0.000 2.463
type4 34969 0.144 0.352 0.000 2.259
GDP source 31416 7.608 1.597 4.553 10.976
GDP host 31416 7.608 1.597 4.553 10.976
Prostitution source 34221 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000
Prostitution host 34221 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000
Rule of Law source 29546 0.006 0.912 -2.153 1.996
Rule of Law host 29546 0.006 0.912 -2.153 1.996
Landlocked source 33660 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000
Landlocked host 33660 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000
Common Border 34969 0.015 0.120 0.000 1.000
Common Region 34969 0.154 0.361 0.000 1.000
Source: Authors' calculations based on US Department of State (2003); 
Protection Project (2002); Alesina et al. (2003); UNHCR; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset;
Gleditsch et al. (2002); World Bank (2004). 




Table 4.1: Direct Impact, Marginal Effects, Ethnic Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation 
Ethnic 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.043***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.010] [0.009]
Ethnic Squared -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.050***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.010]
Refugees/IDPs
refugees/idps dummy 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity 0 ... ... ...
[0.002] ... ... ...
intensity ... -0.003 ... ...
... [0.003] ... ...
count ... ... -0.001 ...
... ... [0.001] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.015**
... ... ... [0.007]
type2 ... ... ... 0.015***
... ... ... [0.002]
type3 ... ... ... -0.004***
... ... ... [0.001]
type4 ... ... ... -0.006***
... ... ... [0.001]
Other controls
GDP Source -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
GDP Host 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Source 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Host 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Source -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Host 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Source -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002** 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Host -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Common Region 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Common Border 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.084*** 0.079***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.014] [0.013]
Observations 13912 13912 21904 21904
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns:  
0.027 for (1) and (2), 0.025 for (3) and (4).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fragmentation, refugees/idps and conflict measures only at source level while
other controls at source and host level. 
Probit Regressions: Direct Impact
Trafficking Incidence (Host-Source) Dependent variable 
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Table 4.2: Direct Impact, Marginal Effects, Religious Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation
Religion 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.045***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010]
Religion Squared -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.062*** -0.048***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.011] [0.011]
Refugees/IDPs
refugees/idps dummy 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity -0.002 ... ... ...
[0.002] ... ... ...
intensity ... -0.005* ... ...
... [0.003] ... ...
count ... ... -0.001 ...
... ... [0.002] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.020***
... ... ... [0.007]
type2 ... ... ... 0.016***
... ... ... [0.002]
type3 ... ... ... -0.003**
... ... ... [0.001]
type4 ... ... ... -0.007***
... ... ... [0.001]
Other controls
GDP Source -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
GDP Host 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Source 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Host 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Source -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Host 0.003* 0.003* 0 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Source -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Host -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Common Region 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Common Border 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.080***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.014] [0.013]
Observations 14060 14060 22052 22052
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns: 
0.027 for (1) and (2), 0.024 for (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fragmentation, refugees/idps and conflict measures only at source level while
other controls at source and host level. 
Probit Regressions: Direct Impact
Trafficking Incidence (Host-Source) Dependent variable 
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Table 4.3: Direct Impact, Marginal Effects, Language Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation
Language 0.005 0.003 0.019** 0.014*
[0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.007]
Language Squared -0.009 -0.008 -0.024*** -0.017**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.009] [0.008]
Refugees/IDPs
refugees/idps dummy 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity -0.001 ... ... ...
[0.002] ... ... ...
intensity ... -0.005 ... ...
... [0.003] ... ...
count ... ... -0.001 ...
... ... [0.002] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.021***
... ... ... [0.007]
type2 ... ... ... 0.016***
... ... ... [0.002]
type3 ... ... ... -0.003**
... ... ... [0.001]
type4 ... ... ... -0.007***
... ... ... [0.001]
Other controls
GDP Source -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
GDP Host 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Source 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Prostitution Host 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Source -0.002 -0.002 -0.004*** -0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Rule of Law Host 0.003* 0.003* 0 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Source -0.004** -0.004* -0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Landlocked Host -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Common Region 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.024***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Common Border 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.083*** 0.077***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.014] [0.013]
Observations 13616 13616 21460 21460
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns: 
0.028 for (1) and (2), 0.025 for (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fragmentation, refugees/idps and conflict measures only at source level while
other controls at source and host level. 
Probit Regressions: Direct Impact




Table 5.1: Probit Regressions, Marginal Effects, Ethnic Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation
Ethnic 0.660*** 0.701*** -0.477*** -0.891***
[0.075] [0.076] [0.056] [0.058]
Ethnic Squared -1.077*** -1.092*** 0.032 0.464***
[0.078] [0.079] [0.059] [0.061]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity 0.368*** ... ... ...
[0.011] ... ... ...
intensity ... 0.378*** ... ...
... [0.016] ... ...
count ... ... 0.601*** ...
... ... [0.010] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.401***
... ... ... [0.028]
type2 ... ... ... -0.138***
... ... ... [0.016]
type3 ... ... ... 0.510***
... ... ... [0.013]
type4 ... ... ... 0.446***
... ... ... [0.012]
Other controls
GDP  -0.172*** -0.170*** -0.162*** -0.153***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Prostitution  0.016* 0.007 0.111*** 0.137***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Rule of Law  -0.170*** -0.194*** -0.196*** -0.155***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Landlocked  -0.114*** -0.097*** 0.004 -0.011
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
Observations 17484 17484 27528 27528
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns: 
0.585 for (1) and (2), 0.426 for (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only Source country side.  
Probit Regressions













Table 5.2: Probit Regressions, Marginal Effects, Religious Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation
Religion 1.873*** 1.878*** 1.972*** 2.028***
[0.075] [0.077] [0.062] [0.063]
Religion Squared -1.994*** -2.067*** -2.449*** -2.457***
[0.088] [0.089] [0.072] [0.073]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity 0.362*** ... ... ...
[0.011] ... ... ...
intensity ... 0.326*** ... ...
... [0.014] ... ...
count ... ... 0.618*** ...
... ... [0.011] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.129***
... ... ... [0.027]
type2 ... ... ... -0.075***
... ... ... [0.017]
type3 ... ... ... 0.491***
... ... ... [0.015]
type4 ... ... ... 0.434***
... ... ... [0.013]
Other controls
GDP  -0.126*** -0.123*** -0.134*** -0.130***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Prostitution  0.067*** 0.056*** 0.146*** 0.162***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Rule of Law  -0.162*** -0.185*** -0.162*** -0.127***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Landlocked  -0.085*** -0.068*** 0.021** -0.001
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010]
Observations 17670 17670 27714 27714
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns: 
0.579 for (1) and (2), 0.423 for (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only Source country side.  
Probit Regressions














Table 5.3: Probit Regressions, Marginal Effects, Language Fractionalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation
Language 1.361*** 1.641*** 0.457*** 0.211***
[0.058] [0.060] [0.051] [0.052]
Language Squared -1.258*** -1.468*** -0.525*** -0.238***
[0.064] [0.065] [0.055] [0.057]
Conflict measures
cumulative intensity 0.400*** ... ... ...
[0.012] ... ... ...
intensity ... 0.503*** ... ...
... [0.016] ... ...
count ... ... 0.587*** ...
... ... [0.010] ...
type1 ... ... ... -0.364***
... ... ... [0.026]
type2 ... ... ... -0.063***
... ... ... [0.016]
type3 ... ... ... 0.482***
... ... ... [0.013]
type4 ... ... ... 0.389***
... ... ... [0.012]
Other controls
GDP  -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.116***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Prostitution  0.014 -0.01 0.116*** 0.133***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Rule of Law  -0.149*** -0.179*** -0.150*** -0.105***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Landlocked  -0.120*** -0.131*** 0.039*** 0.033***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
Observations 17112 17112 26970 26970
Marginal Effects Reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Mean dependent variables, for the different columns: 
0.565 for (1) and (2), 0.414 for (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only Source country side.  
Probit Regressions
Refugees/IDPs Dummy Dependent Variable
 
 
 